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AUTHOR Heater, Derek
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ABSTRACT

The first two chapters of this study concern (1) the neglect of human rights education in the schools and problems associated with this neglect and (2) objectives of human rights education. Objectives include knowledge of historical developments; knowledge of contemporary declarations, conventions, and covenants; knowledge of some major infringements of human rights; understanding the distinction between political/legal and social/economic rights; understanding the basic concepts; understanding the relationship between individual, group, and national rights; appreciation of one's prejudices and the development of tolerance; appreciation of the rights of others; sympathy for those who are denied rights; and developing intellectual and action skills. Other chapters discuss major concepts in human rights, values and attitudes that should be fostered, and intellectual and action skills that should be fostered. The conclusion stresses the need for the continuation of 18th century enlightenment goals of toleration, justice, and humanity. (IS)

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Human rights education in schools : concepts, attitudes and skills

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COUNCIL FOR CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

"HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS: CONCEPTS, ATTITUDES AND SKILLS"

by

Derek HEATER

formerly Head of the History Department, Brighton College of Education, United Kingdom

School Education Division
Council of Europe
Strasbourg
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This study was prepared in 1980 as a working paper for the CDCC's meetings of experts and teachers' seminars on "Human rights education in schools". It has been revised by the author and has been republished to meet the demand by teachers for ideas and information on human rights education. The opinions expressed in the study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Council for Cultural Co-operation of the Council of Europe.

1. NEGLECT AND PROBLEMS

300 years ago (the Second Treatise was probably written about 1680), John LOCKE enshrined his belief in natural rights in the classical formulation of life, liberty and property that was to be so influential among political thinkers and constitution-makers throughout the 18th Century. And echoes of this Lockean tradition are clearly heard in the various declarations, conventions and covenants composed in our own century for the recognition and preservation of what are now termed "human rights".

What is more, the role of education in fostering a climate of opinion conducive to the exercise and enjoyment of such rights has been steadfastly announced in these documents. It is a generation ago now that the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed "that every individual and every organ of society keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms". Thus, the political tradition is venerable, and the educational need is recognised. Yet few countries can boast of a systematic study of human rights in their schools. Before identifying and commending aims and objectives for human rights teaching, it is, therefore, necessary to place them in the realistic context of difficulties to be overcome.

To begin with, one may note the paucity of writing on the subject until the present decade. Much that had been produced hitherto was on the level of merely providing information. "This is what the European Convention on Human Rights says", for example (1). A notable exception was "International Human Rights and International Education" by Thomas BUERGENTHAL and Judith TORNEY (2). But even that study had a heavy emphasis on textual analysis, and, when the authors came to summarise the research that had been undertaken on young people's attitudes towards human rights, they could muster little more than 500 words (3). UNESCO's "Some Suggestions on Teaching about Human Rights" (1968) contained some useful hints but in a rather homogenised way.

Since about 1980, much more attention has been devoted to the matter. For instance, one may note: four articles in "The International Journal of Political Education" (4); a symposium published by the "Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung" in the Federal Republic of Germany (5); and, in the USA, Bulletin No.68 of the National Council for the Social Studies (6). Not surprisingly, UNESCO has continued to take the matter very seriously (7); nor must one forget the significant efforts by the Council of Europe in commissioning studies and organising teachers' seminars.

However, although it is necessary to remark on the comparative neglect of human rights education in many - though, of course, by no means all - countries, the understandable hesitation of teachers to embark on such work must be appreciated. The

scholarly tradition of the study of natural and human rights has been highly abstract. The emphasis has been placed on the disciplines of law and political philosophy, subjects hardly in the mainstream secondary school curriculum. Only comparatively recently have teachers started to liberate themselves from this academic tradition and to use relevant, contemporary concrete issues in order to render the basic principles comprehensible to young people. Even so, the process of introducing systematic human rights education into the curriculum is still difficult if it remains compartmentalised into the traditional subjects. The necessary amalgamation of elements of history, political theory and institutions, international relations, law, sociology and so forth can perhaps be effectively achieved only by team-teaching in a broad social studies syllabus. More often than not, however, the matter of human rights is introduced in partial form in syllabuses constructed with other priorities in mind e.g., the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in a study of the French Revolution or a study of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution in a civics lesson in the USA. It is true that teachers have recently become more conscious of the need to teach about minority groups in order to emphasise their right to equal treatment; but again this is to study human rights in one particular context.

Now the objection to such partial treatment derives from no mere pedant's desire for complete thoroughness, but rather from the fear that a partial treatment of the topic may be more dangerous than total neglect. As I shall be arguing below, in this field of learning, attitude formation is more important than knowledge acquisition. Consequently, if a student emerges from a course of study with a blinkered view of my rights as an individual or our rights as a group or country, the crucial appreciation of the reciprocity and universality of rights may be totally lost. Unless the syllabus and learning experiences are holistic, the outcome may well be a self-centred interpretation of what human rights should mean in practice. For, if the teacher makes no conscious effort to combat these tendencies, children will tend to think about other peoples and countries stereotypically, assuming the excellence of their own country and kind and the inferiority of others. Attitudes of tolerance and empathy need to be fostered; the capacity for reciprocity (that is, the appreciation that other peoples have an equally strong attachment to their own countries) must be nurtured (8).

Just as teachers of human rights should understand the delicacy of their task, so they should appreciate the broad scope of the undertaking. In both substantive content and in pedagogical objectives, a list of civil liberties will no longer suffice. It is essential to emphasise the breadth of effective human rights education in three senses:

(i) the size and relationship of the social units enjoying rights;

(ii) the range of human activities covered by rights;

(iii) the variety of educational objectives to be aimed at.

In the classical, 18th Century understanding of natural rights, it was thought that they should govern the relationship between the individual and the State: the social contract obligated the government to protect these rights; if the government violated the contract, rebellion was justified to restore these inalienable or imprescriptable rights. Indeed, the major theme of 2000 years of political theory, of which the contractual school is but one phase, is the search for justificatory principles regulating the relationship between government and the governed, State and citizen. It may be argued that the very concept of human rights should correctly be confined to this relationship (9). In fact, however, it has been extended so that groups (ethnic and religious) and even States themselves are said to have rights. Crucial to this process of extension was the evolution of the concept of national self-determination. Thus, the two international covenants, drawn up to complement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, share the same first sentence of Article 1: "All peoples have the right of self-determination". The felt need to set down the rights of groups as distinct from individuals is revealed by the multiplication of special declarations and conventions relating to such matters as children, racial discrimination, refugees, slavery, genocide.

This increasing complexity is not just a question of international law and history: it has significant educational implications too. In the first place, it means that, in developing our thinking and practice in the field of human rights education, we must draw upon the dual traditions of civic/political education and education for international understanding. In the United Kingdom, for example, this means not just teaching about civil liberties (Magna Carta, habeas corpus and so forth), but also the rights of immigrants to be protected against discrimination and the interest that the European Commission of Human Rights can properly have in the problem of Northern Ireland. The reiteration of the issue of human rights as a significant factor in sporting contacts between South Africa and the rest of the world and, by President CARTER, in US - Soviet relations has placed the topic securely on the syllabus for teachers of international studies. But, secondly, this broadening of the concept has introduced added complexity and, thus, additional strain on pupils' capacity for comprehension. To "your rights as a citizen" must be added the rights of minorities and consequently the intricacies of balancing liberties with cohesion. Also the problems of the relationship between the northern and southern hemispheres and the ideological cold war between East and West must be considered. However, and thirdly, these complexities do bring advantages. The traditional interpretation of human rights confined the teaching to the area of individual, civil rights; this approach carries with it the danger of a selfish "them and us" vision. The addition of extra dimensions reduces this danger by placing the individual in a complex, albeit perhaps confusing, web of interconnecting and interdependent rights and duties.

In parallel with the extension of the kinds of entities conceived to be endowed with human rights - from the individual to groups - there has been an expansion in the number of human activities thought to be "covered" (almost in the insurance sense) by such rights. From Magna Carta to the French Revolution, the rights that were sought after - to be protected by constitutional and legal enactments - were such basic civil rights as freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of speech and liberty of conscience. In more recent generations, however, the value of the right to starve in freedom has been awkwardly questioned. And so economic and social rights have been added to the agenda - hence the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, for example.

These developments again have important implications for teachers. In the first place, the number of constituent disciplines required for a proper understanding of all these rights is increased: to history and political science must be added sociology and, particularly, economics. Secondly, pupils must be brought to understand the subtle distinction between the two kinds of rights. It is important to appreciate the difference between, say, the right to worship as one pleases and the right to have a job or work. In order to ensure that its citizens enjoy the first kind of right, all the government has to do is refrain from persecuting religious sects and/or to enact legislation to make persecution an offence. But a government cannot will employment, or, more accurately, there is a limit to the extent to which governments can manipulate the labour market short of autocratic direction of labour, which, of course, infringes civil rights. The young and those with modest intellectual endowment tend to view matters in sharply contrasting blacks and whites. Yet, it is important to try to explain that the absence of some rights in some societies is not necessarily the result of their wilful denial by a tyrannical government.

Finally, in this brief survey of the broadening of the scope of human rights education, we must notice the extension of learning objectives beyond the mere acquisition of factual knowledge. Knowledge, of course, there must be, for, without it, the more sophisticated learning of attitudes and skills will lack a properly secure foundation. But few advocates of human rights education would be satisfied if the learning process stopped there. Why teach about human rights? Surely, to render our pupils appreciative of the rights protected by their own society and State; to bring them to a recognition that other peoples have the right to expect similar freedoms; and to be sympathetic to those still struggling to acquire basic rights. In this kind of education, attitudes are perhaps more important than knowledge, and knowledge is but a means to a true shaping of attitudes.

However, if in the development of these attitudes, adolescents conceive a powerful conviction in the sanctity of human rights and see that they are not universally respected, should they not be enabled to take some action in promotion of

the cause? The action would presumably take the form of campaigning for the extension of rights to those who do not enjoy them. If these people are in another country, the teacher may have little cause for hesitation. But if the protest is directed against restrictions imposed by the pupils' own government, the teacher is immediately involved in political activity that could be professionally embarassing. And supposing the pupils campaign for rights within their own school? In recent years, in the United Kingdom, for example, school pupils have become politicised to the extent of the creation of a National Union of School Students and the publication of a "Little Red Book" detailing the rights they should expect to enjoy. If human rights are universal, how can they be denied to any group? Furthermore, is there not something contradictory, even hypocritical, about teachers denouncing the denial of rights in another country while condoning the denial of rights in their school? To adopt such a position is, of course, to deny the in statu pupillari argument, yet it has a consistent logic that is not easy to refute.

2. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

In setting about the construction of a list of aims and objectives, the teacher must keep in mind two basic considerations. One is the extent to which "the hidden curriculum" is influential. Attitudes are shaped more perhaps by the "atmosphere" of the school than by the subject-content of any classroom syllabus. Qualities such as tolerance and regard for others that are so important for a proper appreciation of human rights can be fostered more by enlightened person relationships and school organisation than by the textual analysis of human rights declarations. The second basic consideration is whether a teaching programme is aimed at providing an understanding of the world as it is or as it should be. If teachers consider the latter aim to be important, they will focus attention on current infringements of rights.

This approach can lead quite naturally to a desire to do something about this state of affairs. Recent work in the field of education for international understanding has highlighted the distinctions between the liberal and radical approaches to such studies (10). This work is germane to our own considerations. The radical teacher sees that the world is unjust, that where peace reigns superficially, "structural violence" is endemic. The term "structural violence" was coined by Johan GALTUNG, Director of the International Peace Research Institute at Oslo, to describe conditions of oppression and exploitation, conditions indeed in which human rights are violated.

Moreover, just as in this view peace, justice and equality become virtually synonymous terms, so study seems impossible without consequent action. Education cannot remain neutral. In the words of Adam CURLE, the former Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University, "If we teach about this struggle in educational institutions, we run the danger that the heavy hand of bureaucracy, suddenly realising that we are doing something extremely subversive, will come down on us. This is a danger which I personally face and recognise. When the crunch comes, we shall have to see what we can do. I really believe that education for peace is in a sense a revolutionary activity" (11). For "education for peace" read "human rights education". Teaching about human rights must, thus, lead inevitably to the denunciation of regimes where human rights are denied or abridged and to the mobilisation of the pupils for the protection and extension of their own and others' rights. It is evident that no teacher should embark upon a programme of teaching based upon a radical set of objectives without fully appreciating the far-reaching implications of such a course of action.

With these two important preliminary considerations in mind we can set down a list of objectives that could be considered as suitable for a course of study in human rights.

(i) Knowledge of historical developments

A knowledge of the major "signposts" in the development of human rights is important to provide an historical perspective, to provide an understanding that today's ideals and practices are the result of centuries of struggle and argument. Not only is knowledge of the major documents such as the Magna Carta and the 18th Century American and French declarations essential, but also the historical circumstances which led to their production. Major examples in history of the denial of rights should also be studied, for instance, the institution of slavery and the Nazi persecution of the Jews.

(ii) Knowledge of contemporary declarations, conventions and covenants

There are, of course, too many such documents to study in detail. But young people should know something of their range in order to understand the thoroughness with which the matter has been treated over the past generation. The major rights protected by these documents should be learned.

(iii) Knowledge of some major infringements of human rights

The apartheid system in South Africa, the complaints of the dissident movements in the Soviet Union, the police methods in some Latin American dictatorships, recent brutality in Uganda and the Central African Empire might be taken as examples. But, although these may be taken as major causes of concern, pupils must also learn that virtually no country has a spotless reputation: the observance of human rights is a matter of degree. Some ways in which violations of human rights are monitored, for example by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, should also be dealt with.

(iv) Understanding of the distinction between political/legal and social/economic rights

The traditional struggles to secure rights were directed against governments that persecuted people for their religious beliefs, imprisoned people without just cause or denied to ordinary people any effective political involvement. Pupils should understand the continuing importance of these kinds of rights, but at the same time recognise the increasing importance attached by countries of the Third World to such economic and social rights as social security, membership of trade unions and a reasonable standard of living.

(v) Understanding of the basic concepts of human rights

The range of potential material for teaching about human rights, especially if an historical dimension is included, is enormous. This mass of apparently varied material will be less confusing and more easily comprehended if the teacher emphasises the general concepts that underlie the particular events or

situations. A concept-structure to teaching has two main advantages: exemplification of words (e.g. discrimination, equality, freedom) that might otherwise be used without being fully understood; and the clustering of material into a manageable number of topics.

(vi) Understanding the relationship between individual, group and national rights

Although human rights have been traditionally focussed on the rights of the individual, young people should appreciate that rights can adhere to groups and nations. The principle of national self-determination, for example, the corner-stone of the Versailles peace settlement and reiterated since, is an obvious instance. Declarations against genocide or the persecution of religious minorities also come within this category. However, it is not just a question of understanding that rights exist at these different levels, but also that they are interrelated. In the context of diplomatic relations, the 1970s saw an increasing insistence (in "Basket Three" of the Helsinki Agreement and President CARTER's foreign policy generally) that human rights were not matters of discretely domestic significance, but were rather issues of international moment. In the academic arena, scholars who have developed the field of peace studies, in propounding the concept of "peacelessness", insist on the artificiality of compartmentalising violence, injustice, oppression. Thus, the violation of human rights in one country or in one sense is a violation of the principle of the sanctity of human rights and is, thus, a universal concern. Any matter of interrelatedness is difficult to comprehend, however, and is probably inappropriate for any but the most able pupils.

(vii) Appreciation of one's own prejudices and the development of attitudes of toleration

In any educational process involving the shaping of social attitudes, the Delphic principle of "know thyself" is an essential starting point. People who are selfish, intolerant and prejudiced are unlikely to be appreciative of others' rights. A pupil with a good memory may be word perfect in learning by rote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but will not truly believe in their value if his or her fundamental attitudes are antipathetic to the caring principles that these rights enshrine. It is possible that the necessary process of introspection may be started in the classroom, through discussions and simple psychological experiments; but it is widely agreed that the general atmosphere and ethos of the school, including mutual understanding and respect between teachers and pupils, is a more powerful determining factor in this realm of learning than specific teaching.

(viii) Appreciation of the rights of others

This is essentially an extension of the previous objective. The capacity for reciprocity needs to be developed, that is, the ability of the young person to realise that other people have

strong feelings about their own rights just as much as he has about his. The quality of empathy must be fostered so that the pupil can put himself in another person's place and view matters from the perspective of another person. These modes of thinking are, of course, closely related to an appreciation that duties are an essential reverse side of the rights medal. The universality of rights must, therefore, be emphasised in teaching to guard against the danger that a list of rights might be thought to constitute a licence to defend one's own rights at the expense of the rights of others.

(ix) Sympathy for those who are denied rights

It is a sad reflection on the condition of human rights observance in the world today that so much discussion, and teaching, on the topic is centred on the denial rather than the enjoyment of rights. Learning about these conditions should not be allowed to remain just in the cognitive domain. A true appreciation of the plight of those who are tortured, unjustly imprisoned, suffering from malnutrition or inadequate accommodation, for example, should be instilled by sympathetic teaching. The selection of examples may be a politically delicate problem for the teacher, but such professional hazards must be negotiated by any responsible teacher working in this field.

(x) Intellectual skills

The development of knowledge, understanding and attitudes is a necessary foundation to the acquisition of skills: skills have to be practised on some subject-matter. For some advocates of social and political education, of which human rights education is just one facet, the cognitive and affective learning is almost a subordinate means to the end of exercising practical skills. These skills may be conveniently divided into intellectual and action skills. The kinds of skills pertinent to human rights education are those related to the assembling of factual data. Young people should be provided with the ability to collect information from various sources, including the news media and to marshall evidence clearly, both orally and in writing. But crucial to the really effective exercise of these skills is a carefully honed critical faculty, which schools have a particular responsibility to develop so that their pupils may be able to detect and pierce bias and propaganda.

(xi) Action skills

Many teachers - and pupils for that matter - may feel that having come thus far - knowledge, understanding, attitudes and intellectual skills having been painstakingly acquired - that this educational process has been a frustrating waste of time and effort if some kind of practical action is not the outcome. Why be critically and sympathetically aware of the deprivation of a particular group's human rights if you cannot in however small a way contribute to a righting of these wrongs?

Is it, therefore, not part of the learning process to master the skills of petitioning, lobbying, participating in and organising a pressure group?

Teachers reading through this set of eleven objectives may well feel unable to subscribe to them all. It is very clear, for example, that some require a mental and/or emotional sophistication beyond the capacities of the average young adolescent, while others require a complexity of teaching arrangements beyond the capacity of the school to adopt. They are, indeed, presented rather as a tentative checklist than a definitive prescription.

3. MAJOR CONCEPTS

In the general field of social education, the task of the teacher is not the filling of rows of totally blank minds (though, in an unresponsive class, the rows of totally blank faces may give him serious cause to wonder!). In their ordinary everyday lives, young people will have picked up some scraps of knowledge, some basic principles of behaviour. Among these inchoate fragments will lurk some understanding of rights. These may seem, if and whenever expressed, as bearing little relationship to the juridical formulations of international declarations and covenants. Yet it would be a foolish teacher who did not draw upon these simple ideas among his pupils, and for a number of reasons.

In the first place, children and adolescents feel very keenly about the rights that they believe they should enjoy. As a consequence, by taking these homely examples as a starting point, teachers are likely to command more interest than if they start with arid abstractions. Secondly, much of education involves quite properly the gradual improvement in our conceptual understanding. Concepts that early on are but half-formulated or ill-comprehended are refined and become more accurately understood as their meaning and implications become more surely grasped. Complexities and subtle distinctions hidden from our early blunt understanding become clarified. Some of this process is the result of natural psychological maturation; but, within this basic developmental framework, the teacher has a responsibility to foster and accelerate the process. Thirdly, lengthy lists and quantities of apparently unrelated information are difficult to assimilate. Learning is far more effective if material is clustered into categories and relationships are made explicit - even more so if these classifications relate clearly to the everyday language and experience of the learner.

The explication of concepts has become much more common in both syllabus construction and practical classroom teaching during the past two decades. It is necessary to realise, however, that the word "concept" is used in slightly different ways by different writers. A succinct definition of the word has been provided by Bernard CRICK in an important contribution to the task of identifying political concepts. He writes, "We perceive and we think in concepts. Concepts are, as it were, the building blocks with which we construct a picture of the external world, including imaginary or hoped-for worlds. So concepts are not true or false, they simply help us to perceive and communicate" (12). But, of course, different people perceive the external world in different ways - hence the differing uses of the word. Three main usages may be discerned. First, the untutored description of and reaction to reality, expressed in everyday language unshaped by any conscious technical meaning. Secondly, there is the academic's abstractions, the refinement of everyday thinking into carefully chosen and defined words, the platonic ideals of which earthly experience is but a roughly-cast shadow. And thirdly, there are

the teacher's categorisations, abstract labels to show his pupils the relatedness of what otherwise might appear as disjointed, perhaps even meaningless confusion. Human rights can, indeed, be treated in each of these ways.

A sense that an individual has rights vis-à-vis another individual or an institution is soon absorbed by the young person from his social environment. "I've got my rights", is a phrase that springs readily to the lips, in pained, affronted or aggressive tones. Few, if pressed, could explain whether these rights exist in a philosophical sense as part of the nature of being human, or by social convention or by legal instrument. No matter, it is sufficient to record that many young people are ready to believe that certain rights that they should enjoy do exist and that they are justified in complaining if these rights are abridged or withheld. In fact, young people most frequently conceptualise and verbalise rights in the negative sense of protesting about the infringement of what they perceive as their rights. Some examples will no doubt be familiar - to parents as well as to teachers! "That's not fair!" - this is the common response of the child who has been chastised or punished too harshly according to his own finely graded level of guilt. Children can have a very keen sense of fair play and of what penalties should be exacted for what transgressions. Then there is the bitter complaint, "He's/she's your favourite!" and the mirror-image ..... "You're always picking on me!" - unequal treatment or discrimination in the distribution of unpleasant chores or helpings of food is felt as a sharp grievance. Again, children are capable of quite a sophisticated appreciation of what equality of treatment should mean in practice - ready to accept that others are treated in a more privileged way provided that the inequality rotates with scrupulous regularity. A third example is the kicking against restrictions: "Why can't I stay up late/go out tonight?"

Few young people (pace those middle-aged citizens who bewail the loss of traditional standards) demand complete licence. But even reasonable rules and conventions can be irksome at times, especially if their imposition or restrictions imposed upon what is seen as justifiable action or behaviour is mirrored by the sense of grievance generated by the enforcement of disliked activity. For example, "Why do I have to wear these clothes/visit these boring relations?" - if the enforced activity offends not only against the young person's sense of obligation but also his sense of utility, then the feeling of infringement of rights is accentuated. Finally, there is the sense of collective rights: "We want to choose our own team/class captain" - such a right stems from the belief that the group knows its own interests best or from resentment at what is perceived as interference from an outsider.

Now, although each of these positions illustrated by the quotations can be given the label of an academic concept, the young people who constantly express these views would, of course, be very surprised (perhaps even rather proud in a Jourdainesque

way?). Yet, in truth, what we have been illustrating are the concepts of justice, equality, freedom and self-determination. The following table may help to clarify this relationship:

"I've got my rights"	Rights
"That's not fair!"	Justice
"He's/she's your favourite!"	Equality
"You're always picking on me!"	Discrimination
"Why can't I stay up late/ go out tonight?"	Freedom to
"Why do I have to wear these clothes/ visit these boring relations?"	Freedom from
"We want to choose our own team/ class captain"	Self-determination

The academic aim is, therefore, to bring young people to an understanding that, when they are expressing their everyday views, they are commenting on or dealing with just one instance from a huge range of potential issues that can be embraced by the appropriate term in the right-hand column of the above table. By introducing historical and contemporary material, the teacher will be able to show what each of the examples has in common to justify the use of the same conceptual label.

A short explanation of each of these terms is, therefore, in order here. The word "rights" itself is, of course, a concept, embracing within it the other more detailed or subordinate concepts. The term "human rights" means the conditions of life which man has a right to expect by virtue of being a human being. The concept involves not a statement of fact but rather a yardstick against which conditions in practice may be measured. Nor does the supposed existence of rights necessarily imply the existence or even possibility of laws to enforce or protect rights, though in practice this may sometimes be the case. Rights are the ideals and distinguishing marks of a civilised society. The fundamental concepts embraced in the over-arching concept of rights may be identified as justice, equality, freedom and self-determination.

Justice involves the existence and promulgation of laws and their observation by government authorities. It also implies that the laws are humane in intention and implementation and provide for an appropriate balance between order and freedom, checking both tyranny and anarchy. The true nature and distin-

guishing features of justice have, of course, been the subject of discussion and dispute certainly since Plato. The argument of John RAWLS ("A Theory of Justice", 1972) that equality is an essential ingredient has been widely supported.

Equality also is a concept whose true meaning has been much debated, although it is easier to define and accept the concept in civil and legal than in economic and social terms. Equality of political rights and equality before the law have now been widely established: absolute uniformity of rights and treatment are generally accepted in these spheres. On the other hand, in the matter of social and economic rights it is much more difficult to be clear-cut. All one can perhaps say is that an excessive inequality of wealth and social status involves an infringement of rights. But just how much "too much" is cannot be computed by any universally accepted formulae. Equality of respect perhaps comes near to a social definition of social equality. However, it is sometimes more illuminating to look at the reverse of a concept than to struggle with too precise an account of what the obverse can or cannot mean. So, with equality, we must consider discrimination.

Persons or groups are discriminated against if they are denied or allowed only limited political rights, suffer legal disadvantages or are treated with prejudice. We are very conscious in modern society of ways in which groups - particularly religious, ethnic or racial minorities - suffer discrimination. These are, therefore, examples of the violation of the right to equality.

The close brother to "equality" in the liberal-democratic tradition is "freedom". To change the metaphor, this too is Janus-headed. We need freedom to pursue our interests, wishes and needs, and freedom <u>from</u> unpleasantnesses. In Benthamite terms, we should have the liberty to maximise our pleasures and minimise our pain. In terms of the cataloguing of specific rights, the defensive, negative freedoms relate just to civil and legal rights (e.g. against slavery), while the assertive, positive rights cover in addition the wider spectrum of economic, social and cultural rights (e.g. employment). The distinction is important, as is also, of course, the distinction between freedom and licence. The right to freedom is not a right to engage in unsocial behaviour, to curtail the rights of others, for example the right to privacy. Rights imply duties.

Finally, there is the concept of self-determination, which may be viewed as something like "collective freedom". The principle of national self-determination received widespread recognition at the time of the First World War with the promulgation of Woodrow WILSON's Fourteen Points. It has been subsequently adopted as a fundamental principle in the movement of colonial peoples to independent statehood. The concept involves the right of a people to declare their sense of unity amongst themselves and their right to free themselves from the political control of a people whom they consider alien.

We come now to the third use of the term "concept". We need to consider how, in real-life classroom terms, teachers classify the international lists of rights so as to lead their pupils from a personalised understanding of rights to an appreciation of the broader meaning of the concepts in academic terms. A natural starting point could well be Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person". It is helpful to categorise the usual lists of rights under these three broad headings, noticing the distinction between individual rights and those relating to groups or countries. By far and away the greatest number must be clustered under the banner of liberty. It will, therefore, be convenient to deal briefly with the rights of life and security first. The right to protect and preserve one's own life is, of course, the most fundamental of all rights that an individual can possess, and it features in all the great documents on the matter. However, in the shadow of the Nazi "Final Solution" policies, it is interesting to note that the United Nations thought it prudent to extend the principle of the sanctity of life from the individual to groups: the Genocide Convention of 1948 outlawed the extermination of "national, ethnical, racial or religious groups". Security of person refers to the right of the individual to be protected from torture or degrading treatment.

When we turn our attention to liberty, we need to separate the concepts "freedom from" and "freedom to", and to distinguish political and legal rights from social, economic and cultural. The negative freedoms are those relating to physical liberty such as freedom from slavery, enforced exile and arbitrary arrest; judicial rights such as freedom from retroactive laws and punishments; and the egalitarian rights protecting a person against discrimination based on, in the words of the European Convention on Human Rights, "sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status". The right to protection against discrimination relates also, of course, to groups as well as individuals. The positive political and legal rights deal with civic rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of peaceful assembly and the right to participate in the choice of government; judicial rights like the right to a fair trial; and the rights relating to personal life such as a right to have a nationality, freedom of worship, freedom to marry according to choice, freedom of movement including the right of asylum, personal privacy and the right to own property. It is also recognised that groups, including nations, have political rights. Explicitly they are deemed to have the right to self-determination. Also, implicitly, as BUERGENTHAL and TORNEY point out, the Genocide Convention, "by outlawing the destruction of national, ethnic, racial and religious groups ... formally recognises the right of these groups to exist as groups" (13).

Finally, there are the social, economic and cultural rights characteristic of recent declarations. These are, for

example, the right to work and to a just remuneration for work, the right to a sufficient standard of living to ensure good health, the right to social security provision; the social rights of a life of dignity with a certain measure of rest and leisure; and the cultural rights of a free elementary education for personal development and the ability to enjoy the cultural aspects of life.

This classification, tabulated on the following page, does not match absolutely exactly the "academic" concepts identified earlier, though the skilful teacher should be able to show how they are related without too much confusion.

Teachers must indeed be very careful in the way they introduce the concepts and vocabulary related to human rights if they are not to fall into the trap of pitching their material beyond the conceptual level at which their pupils are capable of operating. PIAGET, of course, has made us all realise that children, as they mature, develop from concrete to abstract modes of thinking. Many a history teacher, for example, has left his class bemused because he has used words in an abstract way, while the child, struggling to make sense, can only translate their meaning in concrete terms. Hence, the well-worn story of the girl who wrote in her notebook, "Wolsey shot the Pope" as her understanding of the teacher's exposition of the Cardinal's ambition: "Wolsey aimed at the Papacy". There is a danger, therefore, of the teacher using words without very careful discussion of the contextual meaning that he is intending. Thus, in the context of human rights teaching, "free" does not mean "without payment" and "equal" does not mean "numerically balanced", although these are the meanings that young people would attach to these words through everyday usage. Moreover, a number of research studies in the field of social and political education have shown that the more abstract and unfamiliar the subject-matter is, the more primitive are the mental operations the young people are able to achieve. This phenomenon is known as "horizontal décalage". The capacity of young people to grapple with abstract principles is affected by a number of facets such as social background and intelligence. Generally speaking, however, speedy progress seems to be made between the ages of about 13 and 15.

In summarising the research work of Joseph ADELSON, Barrie STACEY has provided some usefully succinct generalisations: "The political thinking of the 11 year-old is concrete, personalised and egocentric ... . The 15 year-old is capable of formal thinking using abstract qualities and ideas. He can discuss education or law or government in the concrete or the abstract, switching from the concrete to the abstract and back again. He can use concepts such as authority, individual rights, liberty, equality and representation ... . The citizen is seen (by the child) as owing obligations to the State, but not as possessing rights ... . By the end of adolescence, it is understood that moral principles are relative, law is a human artifact, and to err is human. There is also commitment to liberty, justice and human rights, as well as more recognition of the need to safeguard legally certain rights and freedoms" (14).

	Life	Liberty			Security
		From	To		
	Political - Legal			Economic - Social - Cultural	
Individual	Preservation of life	Slavery, exile, arbitrary arrest Retroactive laws, punishment Discrimination according to race, religion, sex	Speech, assembly, participation in government Fair trial Nationality, religion, marriage, movement, privacy, property	Work, just remuneration, reasonable standard of living, social security Life of dignity, rest and leisure Free education for development of personality, enjoyment of cultural life	Against torture and degrading treatment
Group/ country	Against Genocide	Discrimination	Existence self-determination		

4. VALUES AND ATTITUDES

It is quite possible to teach about human rights in the context of classes on history or law and to present the information in a purely factual way, e.g. the circumstances in which the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen was composed in 1789, or the cases that have been brought before the European Court of Human Rights and their outcomes. However, most teachers who would take the trouble to incorporate the topic in their syllabuses would not be satisfied with such limited purposes. Such teaching would be severely limited if it did not aim to instil a respect for human rights and consequently to foster an appreciation of values and attitudes that are essentially foundations for that respect. Consequently, it is important to identify what these necessary values and attitudes are and to ask how they might be most effectively developed.

In the area of affective education, we are, of course, dealing with a mingling of intellectual and emotional development. However, there are some qualities that might be seen as requiring a stronger intellectual content than others, and it will be convenient to deal with these first.

To start with, the young person must learn that rights are not intended to be interpreted in a selfish sense. There is a difference between freedom and licence, between economic rights and greed. Rights carry responsibilities. Moreover, it is important to establish the principle early on since young adolescents especially think naturally in egocentric terms. It would be most unfortunate if an early impression were acquired that rights are what "I" or "my country" must claim and exercise irrespective of the consequences. An unwillingness to recognise the rights of others may, in fact, derive from prejudice. And so the second important quality is the general quality of intellectual honesty - a recognition of one's own prejudices, a respect for truth and reason. Irrational likes and dislikes cloud judgment; prejudice leads to discrimination. Furthermore, what is needed is not just rote-learned facts used to support an argument in the framework of a teacher-conducted lesson, important as such a procedure is, but rather a general attitude of mind that is suspicious of loose logic and of statements and opinions unsubstantiated by solid fact. Thirdly, the young person must try to see other people's points of view. Intellectually, this requires a leap of the imagination to view another group, country or culture from the standpoint of the other, accepting their standards and assumptions. It also means trying to judge one's own society from the viewpoint of an outsider. These are two facets of empathy. It involves, of course, learning a great deal about other peoples. But the sense of perspective achieved is essential. A flat, two-dimensional blinkered view of the world is a poor picture in which to set a study of human rights.

Empathy is the intellectual prerequisite for developing an attitude of respect for other people, the fourth quality that

must be emphasised. And here we move into the more emotionally-based attitudes. A recognition of the variety of human achievement and culture is essential if the danger of equating difference with inferiority is to be avoided. A belief in the inferiority of a people can lead down the slippery slope to the belief that some abridgement of their rights might be justified. The danger can be particularly insidious with young people, who, in most countries, are socialised into having strong feelings of patriotism. This problem is highlighted by BUERGENTHAL and TORNEY in reporting the effects of teaching about the Constitution and the Bill of Rights in US civics lessons: "there is a tendency among American students", they write, "to think that the rights and freedoms guaranteed to American citizens in those documents are unique in world society. This nation-centrism regarding human rights is reflected, for example, in the tendency of many children to believe that ours is the only country in which the right to peaceful assembly or the right to a fair trial is guaranteed. This may conceivably lead young people to the mistaken impression that people in other countries do not really care about having such rights and freedoms assured to them" (15). Such an attitude of self-satisfied superiority can only hinder a full appreciation of the importance of the universality of human rights as an ideal. Fifthly, we should be seeking to engender feelings of humaneness in our pupils. Feelings of cruelty, retribution and aggression ill-suit an exponent of human rights. The quality of caring is to be nourished.

Indeed, if all the qualities that we have described have been carefully nurtured, the behaviour of the person so educated should be marked by sympathetic and tolerant behaviour. For in cultivating attitudes, we are assuredly seeking to influence behaviour. A sympathetic or compassionate attitude of mind is crucial. Without it, a study of the suffering of people denied rights will remain at the level of academic analysis, the hearts of the pupils unmoved by any feelings of injustice or outrage. Furthermore, let us be clear that sympathy is not synonymous with empathy or pity, being more emotional than the one and more creative than the other. Finally, tolerance. Again, a distinction is crucial. Tolerance does not imply permissiveness or an abandonment of personal standards. Its meaning is frequently summed up in the Voltairean epigram (though he did not write the words), "I abhor your beliefs but I will defend to the death your right to express them". Encouragement of tolerance is important not just for its own sake, not just for encouraging civilised attitudes and behaviour. It is also important for teachers to keep the principle of tolerance in the forefront of their minds so that they do not bring the cause of human rights education into disrepute by exaggerating what it demands of people. It is not humanly possible to love all people equally, to accept the validity of all beliefs, to feel attuned to all cultures; and for teachers to suggest not only that such a generosity of mind is possible but also necessary is to invite incredulity or even despair among his pupils. To try to live with antipathy and respect in juxtaposition is difficult enough, but at least it is a <u>possible</u> goal.

The inculcation of these positive attitudes and values is a hard task in all conscience. Teachers should not make this task doubly difficult by trying to work against the grain of young people's psychological development. Notice should, therefore, be taken of the results of relevant research, patchy as it is. As a result of natural processes of maturation and of socialisation influences, there are significant variations in the hostility and prejudice with which young people view foreigners. At the age of 10, they are likely to have the friendliest attitudes and at the age of 14, the most hostile. Teachers are likely, therefore, to have greater success if they lay sound foundations for an understanding attitude of mind at the younger age than if they attempt an initial frontal assault against the relatively closed mind of the 14 year-old adolescent. Unfortunately, however, the more sophisticated styles of thinking, involving an appreciation of social as against individual considerations and the process of reciprocity, are beyond the capacities of children at the younger age. Without at all underestimating the scale of the task, one can but urge teachers to make the utmost use of the years between about 10 to 13. At least, teachers can try to beware of intensifying prejudice and hostility. For there is plenty of worrying evidence that school structures, teachers' attitudes and handling of subject-matter, syllabuses and textbooks do reinforce illiberal, racialist and xenophobic attitudes.

This danger was highlighted at a conference of distinguished social psychologists held in Cannes in 1969. They drew attention to "many undesirable consequences of the intensification of ethnic and national awareness that occurs in many countries in the course of primary and secondary education". Two specific practices listed are particularly germane to our own field: "Creation of conflicting and destructive self-images and group images in children of minority and underprivileged groups" and "Learning about the child's own group through methods which emphasise the contrast of this group with others may facilitate a 'dehumanisation' of the members of outgroups when subsequent situations of conflict with these outgroups arise" (16). "Dehumanisation" is a frightening word, but, when we realise that, for instance, soldiers who fought against Britain in the Second World War are described as "deadly and fanatical; lousy stinking rats; brainless scum; swine; devils; filthy dogs; slippery as snakes; or slit-eyed killers" in British war "comics" (17), the problem can be seen to be all too real. Moreover, children are influenced by more factors beyond the teacher's control than just their leisure reading. Television and parental attitudes are, of course, particularly pervasive. Social class is an especially powerful factor, the working classes displaying more intense national and class loyalty than others. At the same time, national differences themselves should not be ignored. General national character, traditions and experiences will tend to colour young people's attitudes in detail.

In setting out to help shape the attitudes of their pupils, teachers have then a most difficult task. What teaching methods are most likely to bring success? First and perhaps most important,

the school as a whole must practise what it preaches. In the words of the UNESCO handbook of suggestions, "Learning about human rights should go hand in hand with the practical exercise of rights and duties in daily life. Thus, the atmosphere of the school should be that of a community in which all individuals are treated equally. The principles of human rights should be reflected in the organisation and conduct of school life, in classroom methods, in relations between teachers and pupils and among teachers themselves, as well as in their contribution to the welfare of the wider community outside the school" (18). Practical activities, too, are more efficacious than passive, desk-bound learning, especially if they are of evident use in helping the local community. Failing the opportunity to engage in this kind of work, the surrogate activity of gaming and simulation is to be commended. Thus, the shaping of attitudes and the acquisition of skills become indistinguishable in the teaching methods adopted.

5. INTELLECTUAL AND ACTION SKILLS

The end of all political education is the capacity and desire for action. For the radicals, exemplified by Paulo FREIRE (19), any dichotomy between learning and practical activity is in any case false. "Praxis", the mutual influence of action and reflection, should provide the foundation of effective education, and education should lead to "conscientisation", that is, the ability to perceive political, social and economic contradictions and to take action against these oppressions. FREIRE was writing angrily in the midst of the wretchedness of Brazil, trying to counter the passivity of despair.

But compare the following quotations:

> "Human existence cannot be silent, nor can it be nourished by false words, but only by true words, with which men transform the world .... . But while to say the true word - which is work, which is praxis - is to transform the world, saying that word is not the privilege of some men, but the right of every man. Consequently, no one can say a true word alone - nor can he say it <u>for</u> another, in a prescriptive act which robs others of their words." (20)

> "The real difficulties of political education are likely to lie ... in its encouragement to action. There are still some who appear to want 'good citizenship' without the trouble of having citizens. The great difference between literacy and political literacy is that literacy can involve only a solitary pursuit, but political literacy involves the action and interaction of groups ... The ultimate test of political literacy lies in creating a proclivity to action, not in achieving a more theoretical analysis. The politically literate person would be capable of active participation (or positive refusal to participate) and should not be excluded from the opportunity to participate merely because of lack of prerequisite knowledge and skills .... The politically literate person must be able to devise strategies for influence and for achieving change." (21)

The first is FREIRE; the second is from the report of the British Hansard Society's Programme for Political Education. Radical or liberal, the basic message is very similar.

As these extracts make clear, action involves change. But change can be uncomfortable. If young people are allowed to exercise their basic rights and are encouraged in action, they may use the right to freedom of speech and assembly to demand substantial changes in the organisation and management of their school. Rebellion against teachers' and parents' discipline may be the effect of a greater consciousness of rights. This is not

to enter into a debate about the rights and wrongs of any given disciplinary regime or act of rebellion, but rather to explain the nervousness with which some authorities view the prospect of effective education in political matters.

Nevertheless, if young people are to be equipped for action, we need to know what skills they should possess. It will be useful to make a distinction between intellectual and action skills, and further to sub-divide these respectively into critical and expressive skills and participatory and organisational activity.

A critical approach to evidence is an important aim of social and political education generally. Young people should be taught never to accept without question "evidence" that could be suspect. "How do we know?", "What is the source?". "Is there alternative, opposing evidence?", "What is the motive of the originator of this evidence?". These, and similar questions, should be encouraged by modes of teaching deliberately designed to sharpen the critical faculties. Moreover, these critical faculties should be exercised on a wide range of evidence - in the form of numbers, words and pictures. DISRAELI provided the famous threefold classification of falsehood: "Lies, damn'd lies, and statistics". Figures can be presented out of context; the axes of graphs can be manipulated in order to distort the slant of the plotted curve; judgements can be drawn from figures which cannot logically sustain them. We live in a society that is paradoxically and dangerously highly conscious of numbers yet educationally only semi-numerate. Pupils need to be taught both the value and limitations of figures and the dangers of being misled by cleverly presented distortions. Even the mathematically least skilled can learn to appreciate that numbers may sometimes cloud rather than illuminate the real moral issue. For example, mathematical arguments about the exact numbers that died in Nazi Germany or Democratic Kampuchea may divert attention from justified moral indignation against the facts of mass suffering and deaths that did occur, on whatever scale.

Protection against gullible acceptance of figures is necessary because of the apparent exactness that numbers represent. Protection against words is necessary because of the subtlety with which they can be manipulated. The spoken word particularly, of course, can be used, by careful choice of vocabulary, rhythm of sentence and modulation of voice, to arouse a variety of desired emotions. Skilful orators can, for example whip up passions of prejudice and hatred against religious, racial and ethnic minorities. HITLER is, of course, the most notorious example in recent history. Young people must be alerted to the dangers in order to marshall their defences against such manipulation. The written word is not so potent since the dimensions of vision and sound are absent. Yet, there is a tendency among young people to think that, because a statement is enshrined in print, it must by virtue of that fact somehow be "true". A comparison of different newspaper accounts of the same incident, preferably from different countries, should be capable of inducing the

necessary healthy scepticism. The written expression of opinion must, of course, be treated with even greater caution, especially if it masquerades as fact. In any case, pupils must learn to seek out the relationship between fact and opinion, to ask for the evidence upon which the opinion is based.

If the printed word is hallowed by the mystique of publication, pictures are viewed on the assumption that the camera cannot lie. Since the ideas of the bulk of young people about the world are gleaned at least partially from watching television, the importance of teaching young people how the messages from pictures can be slanted needs to be emphasised. Photographs can, of course, be doctored: for example, individuals can be painted out to "prove" that they were not present at a meeting. There are enough examples of this practice in the history of Stalinist Russia. Pictorial distortion is usually, however, less blatant than this. Correspondents and cameramen sometimes ask people to pose; sometimes the particular camera angle will show a gesture or a juxtaposition of people which suggests a false personal relationship; some important situations cannot be photographed or do not lend themselves to pictorial presentation, and so the absence of pictorial evidence may falsely suggest that they lack significance.

The need to appreciate that numbers, words and pictures may be presented in such ways as to introduce bias into the reporting is highlighted by the omnipresence of television. For television presents material in all three formats. A school course in "tele-literacy" would be of great benefit in preparing young people for responsible adult citizenship. Pupils should be taught to recognise what events are considered "newsworthy" and what are ignored; to distinguish between the impact of words and pictures; to understand the social or political content of some entertainment programmes.

Critical skills are passive skills, essential for filtering the information that a person absorbs, but they need to be complemented by the active skills of expression, both oral and written. Oral fluency and clear articulation are necessary for the effective presentation of a case - that is for the presentation of a case previously prepared. In addition, it is necessary to cultivate the art of debate, the ability to "think on one's feet" and to counter arguments fluently and cogently in the cut and thrust of discussion and argument - whether in the heat of a large meeting or in the cool analysis of a television or radio interview. This oral ability is to a certain extent based on the skills of logical and lucid marshalling of evidence. These can be practised in writing, and indeed should be, since the effective presentation of a written case is equally, if not more, important. Relevance and logical sequence are important qualities to ensure. Different styles of writing should be practised: pupils should be taught the most appropriate kind of writing for a letter to a newspaper, a letter to an elected representative, a petition, a fly-sheet or a poster. In general terms, these skills of expression should feature in any sound educational programme. The task of the teacher of human rights is to use and adapt them for his particular purposes.

How can these skills be brought to bear on real life issues? For if they are not, the pupils may tend to look upon these classes as little better than mere theory, irrelevant to what they, as "impotent" children, can in practice undertake and achieve. Indeed, to provide young people with all the education in human rights knowledge, understanding, attitudes and skills so far described and then to truncate the educational process there could be positively harmful. The natural mood of most young people is political apathy, and the natural assumption is one of political inefficacy. The common attitude of mind is that which says, "I am not interested, and in any case, if I were, there is nothing I can do about it". It is the duty of teachers of human rights in these circumstances to bring their pupils to a responsible interest in such problems and to a realisation that, with the necessary effort, everyone can help in some small way.

The simplest form of action is participation. Young people should recognise that involvement and help is part of being a responsible person. This is not to argue that everyone must be a frenetic busy-body, but rather that, if an individual is always on the sidelines, always expecting someone else to take action, his sense of social and civic responsibility is sadly underdeveloped. Young people may gain experience in participative activity at home, in school and in their local community. Involvement in discussion about family plans - for spending money, arranging holidays, allocating household chores, depending on the socio-economic level - is vitally important in the social development of the child. It is difficult (though not absolutely impossible, through parent-teacher associations) to affect family customs. But, at least, the teacher should be alert to the possibility that what he is trying to encourage in school may run counter to the deeply ingrained experiences of the child at home. It takes great faith, of course, to introduce into a school a system of management genuinely run by the children. One of the most famous of such systems was developed in the United Kingdom at Summerhill, a school founded by A.S. NEILL. He has written as follows: "The key to all child-centred education is self-government .... at Summerhill self-government works. Each child has a vote and a voice, irrespective of age. I myself do not take much part in the weekly meetings ..... The children are learning to live with others by interaction with their peers, being judged by their equals and not by their fathers and mothers and teachers" (22). In most schools, total pupil-government is, of course, out of the question. However, if there is no mechanism for allowing the pupils to express their views or if their views are totally ignored, any academic teaching about human rights is in danger of becoming a hypocritical mockery.

Participation need not be confined to home and school. Indeed, an appreciation of the needs of the community outside these closed environments must be encouraged. Opportunities should be sought in the wider community to provide help where it is needed and would be welcomed. The practical activity should, naturally, relate clearly to the studies being undertaken in the

classroom so that the modes of learning in and out of school can be mutually reinforcing. Here is a description of how a school in Toronto in Canada planned a course to culminate in practical activity:

> "Areas of study were mainly concerned with minority groups, housing, adoption, age discrimination, alcoholism and drug addiction, women's rights, education, and law and the criminal. Interested teachers and pupils met to discuss plans for the study which, it was suggested, should culminate in the writing of reports on various problems, for presentation to the local agencies concerned. Background information was to be gathered through the students' researches, to be undertaken with guidance from their teachers. These would involve reading; visiting agencies, individuals and institutions concerned with the problems being studied; inviting experts in the community to discuss these problems with school classes; making surveys; and possibly undertaking voluntary welfare work if the occasion arose." (23)

In fact, it would be more efficient if the practical work were first arranged, or at least envisaged, and the classroom work were then designed to provide foundation and follow-up studies. After all, it is easier to adapt the classroom material than to find community work that will exactly fit a preconceived pattern. Some of the more obvious activities are listed in the above passage. It is useful to expand just a little on these.

It will clearly often be more efficient to work in close liaison with agencies already operating in the field and, therefore, knowledgeable about problems than to try to make arrangements ab initio. Official agencies or local branches of voluntary, charitable bodies could help in this way. Charitable organisations would particularly welcome fund-raising activities on their behalf. Moreover, projects to raise money are popular with young people because they are comparatively easy to organise, require no technical skills, and progress is plainly measured by the sums collected. Help beyond the pupils' own immediate community can be provided by working through United Nations specialised agencies such as UNESCO or UNICEF. The disadvantage of fund-raising activities is the frequent depersonalisation of the schemes: donors rarely meet the recipients or even know who they are; and the financial nature of the activity may give the impression that consciences can be squared by monetary transactions. These problems do not arise with local community activities involving help to the old, sick or disabled. This kind of work will impress upon young people, particularly those from fortunate backgrounds, how insecure is some people's enjoyment of basic social and economic rights. In most cases covered by the fund-raising and community help kinds of activities, improvements could not easily or immediately be achieved by official action. Where this evidently can happen, the opportunity is presented for a protest movement - for example, against sex or racial discrimination or unacceptable housing.

The majority of activities, of whatever kind, will inevitably take place within the locality of the school. Lack of time, money and contacts will normally prohibit any activities further afield. Nevertheless, it is worth citing the initiative and imagination of the fieldwork activities associated with the Peace Studies programme at Atlantic College in South Wales. The course is part of an International Baccalaureate programme at this international school. Partly because of the special circumstances obtaining at the school and partly because of the energetic commitment of the staff, especially Colin REID, the then Director of Studies for this programme, it was possible to arrange for students to undertake community work in Northern Ireland, an area of community tension and conflict. An interim report gives an indication of the activities that have been arranged:

> "In September 1975, eleven Atlantic College students and one member of staff spent a week in Belfast working on a programme devised by Voluntary Service Belfast (VSB), an independent welfare organisation partly supported by government funds. A similar visit was paid in September 1976, and in the summer of 1977 a group of Atlantic College students spent a month working on a variety of social service projects in the most difficult areas of the city. One student from the original party is now starting her second year of full-time service as a 'long-term volunteer' running a children's play group in West Belfast. Several other former students have worked in Northern Ireland during university vacations." (24)

For the younger pupils, participation in activities organised on their behalf by the teacher is about as far as one can expect pupil activity to go. But, as the pupils grow older and gain experience in this kind of work, they should be encouraged to undertake the organisation themselves. Qualities of initiative and leadership can, thus, be fostered, together with a heightened sense of responsibility and achievement in activities which are truly and fully the pupils' own.

6. CONCLUSION

Ideas of toleration, justice and humanity, through intellectual, legal and political struggles, eventually achieved widespread recognition in the Atlantic world of the 18th Century. Yet, these precious gifts of the Enlightenment have been undermined and have seemed in danger of destruction in the practices of totalitarian regimes and total wars of our own century (25). We must, therefore, make all possible efforts to preserve this priceless inheritance from the age of Voltaire. Education, in its role of helping to formulate public opinion, has a vital role to play. This study is a tentative sketch of some of the principles that might form the basis of that crucially important part of school learning, and it is hoped that the ideas are not too unrealistic for translation into practical school work.

We are,indeed, dealing with a very difficult area of teaching because the formation of attitudes is central to the task. This is an aspect of teaching fraught with the dangers of indoctrination, of haziness about what methods are most appropriate and of difficulties surrounding any attemt to test the efficacy of one's teaching. Yet, even the least self-confident teacher should not shrink from the task; for even the task just of alerting young people to the basic issues is necessary and urgent. However, when teachers are selecting <u>what</u> to teach about human rights, let them consider rather more carefully than usual <u>how</u> they are going to present that subject-matter. An education that gives due regard to the growing personality of the pupil is itself a right that should be enjoyed by all young human beings.

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15. Op. cit., pp. 112-113.

16. H. TAJFEL, "Aspects of national and ethnic loyalty" in "Social Science Information", Vol. 9 (1970), pp. 134,135.

17. N.B. JOHNSON, "What do children learn from war comics?" in "New Society", Vol. 8, July 1966, p. 9.

18. Some "Suggestions on Teaching about Human Rights", UNESCO, Paris, 1968, p. 19. For research evidence, see J.V. TORNEY, A.N. OPPENHEIM and R.F. FARNEN, "Civic Education in Ten Countries", IEA/Almquist and Wiksell International, Stockholm, 1975, chap. 10.

19. See "Pedagogy of the Oppressed", Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972.

20. Ibid., pp. 60-61.

21. B. CRICK and A. PORTER (eds.) op.cit., p. 41.

22. A.S.NEILL, "Freedom Works" in J. HALL (ed.), "Children's Rights: Towards the Liberation of the Child", Elek Books, London, 1971, pp. 129-130.

23. UNESCO op.cit., p. 95.

24. United World College of the Atlantic, mimeo report on the Peace Studies Project, p. 21.

25. See, for example, A. COBBAN, "In Search of Humanity: The Role of the Enlightenment in Modern History", Cape, London, 1960.